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As conflicts continue to rage throughout 
the Middle East in the wake of the 2010 
Arab uprising, divisions across ethnic and 
religious lines in several regional countries 
have brought consociational models of 
governance back into the spotlight. In an 
effort to reconcile inter-group conflicts and 
regulate power sharing in the region, public 
discussions have highlighted the role of 
consociational arrangements in resolving 
conflict in Lebanon. Lebanon has 18 officially 
recognized sects. Under the Lebanese 
consociational system, agreement among 
the leaders of the major sects (Sunni, Shia, 
and Maronite) is required to pass a policy, 
approve an official’s appointment, convene 
parliament, or for a president to be elected 
(i.e., parliament does not convene and 
elections are not held unless the sects agree 
on the winning candidate in advance). The 
Lebanese model, or the “Lebanese formula” 
as described by Hudson (1997, 107), has 
regained prominence.
 The Lebanese consociational structure 
was first implemented after the National 
Pact of 1943. The sectarian-consociational 
model was subsequently amended in the Taif 
Agreement, which ended the civil war in 1989. 
Most recently, the principles of this model 
were re-confirmed in the Doha Agreement 
in 2008. Lebanon’s political history indicates 
that these consociational agreements reflect 
a common understanding that no viable 
alternative to consociationalism that would 
ensure the functionality and continuity of 
Lebanon exists. It was clear for the fathers of 
independence in Lebanon that a “communal 
representation” and power-sharing model is 
required to achieve a stable political process 
and accommodate the concerns of sectarian 
groups (Hudson 1997, 106). 
 In light of this renewed attention on 
the Lebanese model, it is necessary to 
re-evaluate Lebanon’s consociational system 
in order to gauge whether it would be useful 
for other countries in the region experiencing 
similar ethnic or religious divisions. 
THE TAIF AGREEMENT
The Taif Agreement was meant to restore 
the consociational model as the country’s 
governing mechanism and reduce 
institutionalized sectarianism. It was verbally 
agreed that the president of Lebanon must 
be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, 
and the speaker of parliament a Shia. To 
this end, the accord tasked the Chamber of 
Deputies with organizing a national dialogue 
on the country’s political transition. The 
parliament was to establish a national 
committee that included the leaders of the 
three sectarian communities mentioned 
above as well as other national political 
figures. The accord stated that after the 
election of a national non-sectarian-based 
Chamber of Deputies, a Senate that would 
include religious leaders and would have 
authority only on the most important 
national issues was to be formed (Salamey 
and Payne, 2008, 461). Yet this transitional 
phase, as it were, has instead become the 
status quo, from which leaders of Lebanon’s 
religious communities have little incentive 
to deviate. While initially formulated to 
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system in which populist sectarian leaders 
rule, strengthening their communities 
and establishing transnational ties that 
undermine the central government. In this 
system, the sectarian leaders’ chief interest 
is to maintain the status quo, thereby 
ensuring their hold onto power. One of the 
key mechanisms by which they achieve 
this is to focus the public’s attention 
on the provision of daily needs such as 
electricity and water, which Lebanon has 
been suffering shortages of for more than 
four decades. By providing these services 
via established communitarian sectarian 
networks—including schools, hospitals, 
NGOs, media channels, and religious 
institutions—the sectarian groups further 
reinforce the existing system. Each caters 
to its respective members, which further 
underscores a sense of belonging to a 
specific sect rather than belonging to the 
larger Lebanese state. 
 As a communitocracy, Lebanon 
lacks both a unified national identity and 
national goals. Instead, communitarian 
networks undermine the efficacy of the 
central government, thereby elevating 
their positions as providers of services 
for their own communities. Lebanese 
citizens’ persistent identification with their 
sectarian communities leads to recurrent 
internal conflicts and intolerance among the 
Lebanese population. 
 Many observers have come to view this 
confessional system as a major source of 
political gridlock in Lebanon. Yet others see 
this sectarian communitarian structure as 
a necessity to protect minorities, maintain 
political stability, and give each community a 
fair share of the political power. Scholars who 
study the Lebanese formula debate whether 
the consociational model of governance 
that was refined after the Taif Agreement 
was an adequate solution or if it conversely 
was part of the problem (Hudson 1997, 106). 
While both views have their merits, what 
remains obvious is that in such a deeply 
divided population, within which various 
sectarian communities mobilize around rival 
political visions and interests, the state and 
national identity are greatly undermined. This 
is particularly true because “the struggle 
for democracy requires the eradication 
establish a consociational democracy in 
which the role of sectarian leaders in the 
country was to be limited to certain national 
issues, the Taif Agreement has trapped 
Lebanon in a cycle of sectarian tension, 
conflicts of interest, and occasional violence.
BASICS OF THE ACCORD
The Taif Agreement was negotiated in Taif, 
Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 to end the 
Lebanese civil war. It introduced political, 
administrative, and other reforms aimed 
at re-establishing political and economic 
stability in Lebanon. It maintained the general 
characteristics of the existing power-sharing 
system, but redistributed domestic political 
power among the major sects—Maronite, 
Sunni, and Shia. Its main provisions state 
that Lebanon is Arab in identity and that its 
political system is a parliamentary democracy 
based on the principles of separation, balance, 
and cooperation among the three branches 
of government. And, most importantly, the 
accord lists abolishing political sectarianism as 
a basic national goal, to be achieved gradually 
over time, although no specific deadline or 
plan of action was provided for its execution. 
 Almost three decades after the Taif 
Agreement, the population is still divided, 
parliament is still sectarian-based, and 
the electoral system reinforces sectarian 
representation. Public offices are allocated 
in accordance with sectarian divisions. The 
central government has weakened, and 
sectarian communities are taking over 
its role by providing in-group services, 
as discussed below. The trash crisis that 
Lebanon has struggled with over the 
past three years—whereby the country’s 
landfills have reached capacity, and there 
is no agreement on alternative ways to 
manage this issue, leading to garbage 
piling up around Lebanon—is a perfect 
illustration of the government’s inefficiency 
in handling its basic duties. The crisis is 
the result of high levels of corruption and 
gridlock inside the government. 
 In this sense, Lebanon has moved 
away from democratic governance. What 
can be observed instead is the rise of 
a consociational communitocracy—a 
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of political clientelism, nepotism and 
patronage, and the establishment of national 
institutionalism” (Plattner 2010, as cited in 
Salamey and Tabar 2012). If a population is 
divided along sectarian lines, mobilized by 
sectarian leaders, served by sectarian-based 
networks, and focused on communitarian-
defined interests, then favoritism, corruption, 
and a weak central authority will hinder 
efforts to establish an effective and legitimate 
state organization.
 Lebanon’s inability to develop such a 
state stems from two issues: the societal 
fragmentation in a rigid confessional system 
of governance, and the country’s high 
susceptibility to external influences (Salamey 
and Payne 2008, 453). These sectarian 
groups, dubbed as sub-state communities, 
have formed strong ties with trans-border 
groups, organizations, or states and sought 
protection to compensate for the state’s 
malfunctioning. The two main examples 
include the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the 
Saudi-backed Future Movement.
 What complicates the prospects for 
moving beyond confessionalism in Lebanon 
is lack of competition. The confessional elites 
do not face much competition for power 
or even calls for accountability from within 
their own communities. Disproportionate 
majorities in each sectarian community view 
their respective sectarian leaders positively. A 
survey conducted at the Lebanese American 
University (LAU) revealed strong sectarian 
populist sentiments among residents, which 
explain the lack of motivation among the 
general public to hold their leaders to 
account. The survey finds that 70 percent 
of Shiites, 53 percent of the Sunnis, and 41 
percent of the Maronites believe that “their 
leader has rarely or never committed a 
mistake over the past five years” (Salamey 
and Tabar 2012, 505). 
LOOKING FORWARD
Changes to the confessional system in 
Lebanon is urgently needed because the 
persistence of the existing confessional 
power structure has stalled progress 
toward the realization of consociationalism 
as a democratic form of governance and 
threatens civil peace in the country. How 
can Lebanon move beyond communitocracy 
and establish its democratic governance in 
line with a consociational structure? Key 
steps include strengthening the parliament 
and introducing a proportional electoral 
system in place of the current majoritarian 
one to undermine the rigid confessional 
power-sharing structure.
 The comprehensive implementation 
of consociational democracy in Lebanon 
hinges on establishing a proportional 
representation system—an essential 
condition for consociational systems—in 
order to move away from confessional 
representation toward a more responsive 
model that allows for newly emerging and 
independent candidates to win seats. The 
2018 parliamentary elections, which were 
held under a new proportional law, offered 
hope in this regard. Lebanon tested a new 
proportional list voting system instead of a 
bloc vote majoritarian one; however, the 
sectarian quota feature was left intact in 
the new electoral law. Among its main 
shortcomings was the fact that votes in 
some districts had more weight than in other 
districts. Under the new law, voters cast 
two votes: one for a fixed electoral list in 
their district and a second for their preferred 
candidate within that list. Hence, the degree 
of proportionality varied from one district to 
another. If a list wins five out of eight seats, 
for example, the top five candidates on the 
list will each win a seat. The sixth candidate 
might have a total of 8,000 votes but will 
not get a seat because the list the candidate 
belongs to has already filled its five allocated 
seats. This will allow a candidate from a 
different list with significantly fewer votes to 
win this seat.
 The electoral turnout in 2018 was 49.7 
percent, 5 percent less than that of 2009. 
Only six women were elected, compared to 
four women in 2009. Several independent 
candidates and lists appeared on the 
ballots but only one candidate, Paulette 
Yacoubian, won. Populist sectarian leaders 
and patronage networks still dominated 
the political game, and the new electoral 
law continued to work in their favor as it 
largely inhibited independent electoral lists 
from winning. As a result, a majority of 
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the previous members of parliament were 
re-elected.
 Another crucial step to resolve the 
sectarian-driven conflicts and gridlock in 
Lebanon is moving toward a more secular 
form of governance. The religious and 
public spheres in Lebanon are not separated. 
Personal status courts are still managed by 
religious laws. Lebanese citizens must follow 
the laws of their specific sects in regard to 
issues such as inheritance, marriage, and 
divorce, among others. Unifying the personal 
status laws, of which there are 18 separate 
laws, will help in gradually moving toward a 
secular government. Such a move would aid 
in de-emphasizing the sectarian identities of 
Lebanese citizens, which can boost citizens’ 
sense of belonging to and identification with 
Lebanon. Likewise, it can create a greater 
sense of equality under the law. 
IMPLICATIONS
There are several problems associated 
with the Lebanese system that hinder 
Lebanon from becoming a better democratic 
state: well-established and deep-rooted 
communitarian networks that more and 
more resemble states within the state, an 
electoral system that reinforces sectarian 
divisions and communitarian power, and the 
religious repercussions Lebanese citizens 
face over personal status issues. 
 Lebanon remains a complex model 
to study due to its multilayered structure. 
The fact that no single group is capable of 
establishing hegemony implies that power 
sharing remains an essential prerequisite 
for an alternative to the current system. 
Simultaneously, however, it is in itself a 
major obstacle, hindering the country from 
reaching stability and further development. 
The latest elections were unable to induce 
change, and the same political figures 
remained in power. 
 As the response to the Arab Spring 
continues to unfold in the Middle East, a 
large number of dormant ethnic and 
religious divisions have regained significance 
in recent years. It is within this context 
that Lebanon has become the subject of 
discussions on whether it can serve as a 
model for other countries in the region in 
their efforts to establish peace and stability. 
However, for various reasons discussed 
above, Lebanon falls short of being an ideal 
model for Arab states. Although Lebanon’s 
consociational system helped mitigate 
conflicts within a deeply divided population, 
it remains stalled in a transitional phase 
almost three decades after the Taif 
Agreement was signed.
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